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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THE SUNNY FACTORY, LLC,
v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

HAOYI CHEN, ESQ., et al.,
Defendants.

No. 21 C 3648
Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff The Sunny Factory, LLC sells candles on Amazon that have a pattern of light
green sage leaves on the outside of the candles. Sunny Factory brought claims against Defendants
Haoyi Chen, Esq. and Arch & Lake, LLP (“Defendants”), who are lawyers, alleging that the
attorneys’ actions are causing harm to Sunny’s business. (Dkt. 1). Defendants represent Fuxi
(Hangzhou) Intellectual Property Management Co. Ltd., a foreign corporation and the owner of a
copyrighted image of painted green sage leaves. When Defendants reported to Amazon that their
client’s copyright was being infringed, Amazon stopped the sale of Sunny’s products. Plaintiff
then sued under the federal Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512, and
also brought state law claims for defamation and tortious interference with a contract. (Id.). For
the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [5] is granted.
BACKGROUND
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the complaint’s wellpleaded factual allegations, with all reasonable inferences drawn in the non-moving party’s favor,
but not its legal conclusions. See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir.
2014). Unless otherwise noted, the following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s
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Complaint [1] and are assumed true for purposes of this motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016).
The Sunny Factory is a domestic corporation marketing and selling scented candles on
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) and organized under the laws of Florida. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 22). Fuxi
(Hangzhou) Intellectual Property Management Co. Ltd. (“Fuxi”) is a foreign corporation and the
copyright owner of “Green Sage,” an image of painted sage leaves, U.S. Copyright Reg. No.
VA0002247096. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 24). Fuxi is a client of Haoyi Chen, Esq., an attorney employed at
Arch & Lake, LLP in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff also brings this claim against John
Does 1 – 5, unknown to Plaintiff but believed to be involved in the relevant acts. (Id. at ¶ 25).
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to the defendants in unison. (Id.).
According to The Sunny Factory, Defendants filed knowingly false and frivolous claims
with Amazon alleging its candle products and packaging contain images violating Fuxi’s “Green
Sage” copyright. (Id. at ¶ 2). The Sunny Factory instead claims the packaging was pulled from a
third party and is not original to Fuxi. (Id. at ¶ 3). Fuxi’s copyrighted image “Green Sage” (Exhibit
A) and The Sunny Factory’s candle product (Exhibit B) are included below for reference, and both
include images of painted light green sage leaves. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 12).

Exhibit A

Exhibit B
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Defendants filed notices with Amazon, pursuant to the DMCA, claiming The Sunny
Factory used copyrighted images. (Id. at ¶ 4). In response, Plaintiff filed counter-notices, and
Amazon de-listed the products. (Id. ¶¶ 4 – 7). Defendants re-filed the identical complaint with
Amazon, forcing Amazon to maintain the removal of The Sunny Factory’s products causing
Plaintiff economic harm. (Id. at ¶¶ 4 – 7). Specifically, Haoyi Chen submitted complaints to
Amazon regarding three of Plaintiff’s products on November 7, 2020 and twice on January 31,
2021. (Id. at ¶¶ 35 – 36). Amazon has an automated process for addressing complaints related to
infringement of copyrighted material and suspends the subjects of such complaints. (Id. at ¶¶ 29
– 30). The Sunny Factory appealed the suspension of its Amazon sales privileges but has been
prohibited from selling the relevant products on Amazon since November 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 39 –
43). The resulting economic harm amounts to a loss of $500,000 per month in sales. (Id. at ¶¶
10).
The Sunny Factory owns the packaging design, U.S. Copyright Reg. No. VA 0002236068,
accused by Defendants of copyright infringement. (Id. at ¶ 11). The Sunny Factory submitted a
Notice of Preservation on May 4, 2021 to Amazon raising this issue. (Id. at ¶ 37). The Sunny
Factory reached out on May 27, 2021, to Defendants requesting a voluntary revocation of the
complaint with Amazon to no avail. (Id. at ¶ 38). Since around May 2021, Amazon accuses The
Sunny Factory of “Suspected Copyright IP Violation” and Plaintiff has no avenue to appeal this
description of its account. (Id. at ¶ 44).
Plaintiff raises six claims for relief. The first count is a request for declaratory judgment
of non-infringement as a matter of law under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. (Id. at ¶¶ 47 – 57). As second
and third counts, Plaintiff accuses Defendants of defamation and defamation per se. (Id. at ¶¶ 58
– 84).

The Sunny Factory’s fourth claim for relief is based on tortious interference with
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prospective economic advantage. (Id. at ¶¶ 85 – 89). The fifth claim is tortious interference with
business and contractual relations. (Id. at ¶¶ 90 – 99). Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendants
violated the DMCA by “knowingly materially misrepresenting that Plaintiff’s candles comprise
infringing material.” 17 U.S.C. §512(f)(1); (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 100 – 03). On January 14, 2022, The Sunny
Factory moved for a default judgment as to Fuxi which was granted on February 16, 2022. (Dkt.
18; Dkt. 21).
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a complaint must ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Adams, 742 F.3d at 728 (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[I]t is not enough for a complaint to avoid foreclosing possible
bases for relief; it must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief…by providing
allegations that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health
Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (emphasis in
original). The Court construes the complaint “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
accept[s] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[s] all inferences in her favor.” Reynolds v. CB Sports
Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2010). “[L]egal conclusions and conclusory allegations
merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.” McCauley
v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678).
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DISCUSSION
A. Count I: Declaratory Judgment
In the Motion to Dismiss as well as in Plaintiff’s Response, both parties stipulate that no
“actual controversy” exists between Plaintiff and the Defendants. (Dkt. 5; Dkt. 12). The
Defendants are not the owners of the copyright for “Green Sage” and could not bring a copyright
infringement action against the Plaintiff. (Id.). The first count is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Counts II & III: Defamation Causes of Action
Plaintiff claims that the statements made by the Attorney Defendants to Amazon constitute
defamation because they falsely allege that Plaintiff was infringing the Green Sage copyright.
These statements were notices to Amazon by the attorneys that the copyright was being infringed.
The only acts giving rise to the claims of defamation in the Complaint are the two submissions to
Amazon providing notice of copyright infringement. (Dkt. 1). The Sunny Factory does not allege
any other actions that could be considered the basis for the defamation claims in Counts II and III.
(Id.). The notice statements then triggered the Amazon policy of removing the potentially
infringing products.
Statements made in the course of litigation are absolutely privileged from claims of
defamation. Lewis v. School Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 745 – 46 (7th Cir. 2008). “An attorney at
law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as
part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the
proceeding.” Id. (quoting Atkinson v. Affronti, 369 Ill. App. 3d 828 (2006) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 586 (1977)) (emphasis in original)). This applies regardless of any knowledge
by an attorney of the statement’s veracity. Id. In Atkinson, the Court held an attorney’s statement
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to the plaintiff’s employer of an intention to hold the employer vicariously responsible was
privileged because it was made by an attorney in contemplation of litigation, even though no civil
litigation ultimately followed. Atkinson 369 Ill. App. 3d.
Since the statements at issue here were made to Amazon during the notice and takedown
period, they are absolutely privileged. (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 5). Both parties recognize that the notice and
takedown period may result in litigation if either party disagrees with Amazon’s. (Dkt. 5; Dkt.
12). Plaintiff provided its understanding of the process in its Response: “The DMCA exists to
protect third-party platforms, such as Amazon, from liability by affording copyright owners the
ability to notify them of potential infringement, who then notifies the alleged infringer, who has
the right to file a counter-notice that then requires the rights owner to file a lawsuit and have its
allegations addressed in a judicial proceeding.” (Dkt. 12) (emphasis added). In its Response,
The Sunny Factory admits that the process of filing a notice of copyright infringement anticipates
the potential for a judicial proceeding.

It is clear these proceedings are communications

preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding. Lewis at 745. Any doubt as to whether a statement
is relevant to a judicial proceeding “should be resolved in favor of a finding of pertinency.”
Malevitis v. Friedman, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1131 (2001). Counts II and III are dismissed.
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C. Counts IV & V: Tortious Interference
Counts IV and V allege tortious interference with prospective economic damage and
tortious interference with business and contractual relations. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 85 – 99). An attorney
owes a fiduciary duty to his or her client and as such is privileged to act “to protect a conflicting
interest which is considered to be of equal or greater value than that accorded the contractual rights
involved.” Schott v. Glover, 109 Ill. App. 3d 230, 234 – 35 (1982).
A plaintiff can overcome the privilege accorded an attorney acting in the interest of a client
and sufficiently “state a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract . . . if the plaintiff
can set forth factual allegations from which actual malice may reasonably be said to exist . . . Such
allegations, however, would necessarily include a desire to harm, which is independent of and
unrelated to the attorney’s desire to protect his client.” Schott, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 235 (citing
Arlington Heights Nat’l Bank v. Arlington Heights Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 37 Ill.2d 546
(1967)).

To defeat Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege facts

amounting to malice that would overcome the conditional privilege. See Storm & Associates, Ltd.
v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1052 – 53 (1998) (“When . . . the existence of a privilege in
favor of the defendant is apparent on the face of a claim for tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, it is the plaintiff’s burden to plead and prove that the defendant’s conduct
was unjustified or malicious . . . . The bare conclusions that [Defendants] acted intentionally,
maliciously, and without cause or justification are insufficient to negate the protection of the
privilege arising by reason of the attorney-client relationship here.”).
Plaintiff did not allege actual malice in Counts IV or V. Rather, the only assertion of actual
malice is included in the Complaint under Counts II and III. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 64, 77). In both cases, The
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Sunny Factory provided blanket statements that the Defendants in unison “acted with actual malice
or with reckless disregard for the truth of their statements to Amazon.” (Id. at ¶ 77). At no point
did The Sunny Factory allege any specific facts to support this claim. (Id.). Making broad
assertions that mimic the elements of the claim is not sufficient to meet the requirements for a
well-pleaded complaint. McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616. Copyright holders have an obligation to
police the field where their marks may be used and to give notice to potential infringers in order
to preserve their rights. Wildlife Exp. Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir.
1994) (“An owner of a copyright is protected against unauthorized copying.”) (citing Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.s. 201, 218 (1954). Without facts that take this out of the ordinary behavior of
copyright holders, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Additionally, The Sunny Factory neglected to
meaningfully respond to the assertion of privilege in its Response, citing no cases in response to
the Defendants’ argument that privilege protects them from the allegations in the Complaint. (Dkt.
12). Counts IV and V are dismissed.
D. Count VI: Violation of DMCA Copyright Act
There is limited case law in the Seventh Circuit interpreting a cause of action based on 17
U.S.C. §512(f). Defendants put forward case law from other jurisdictions to support the premise
that Plaintiff insufficiently pled facts to constitute a violation. (Dkt. 5). In order to survive
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, The Sunny Factory must plead facts demonstrating that
Defendants “knowingly materially misrepresent[ed] . . . that material or activity is infringing . . .
.” 17 U.S.C. §512(f)(1). This provision imposes a high standard for finding a violation of the
DMCA by a copyright owner in infringement notifications. The Ninth Circuit held as much in
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., stating, “In §512(f), Congress included an expressly
limited cause of action for improper infringement notifications, imposing liability only if the
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copyright owner’s notification is a knowing misrepresentation. A copyright owner cannot be liable
simply because an unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in
making the mistake…Rather, there must be a demonstration of some actual knowledge of
misrepresentation on the part of the copyright owner.” 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 – 05 (9th Cir. 2004).
This Court comes to the same conclusion. It cannot be that Congress intended broad punitive
authority to curtail inaccurate notifications of copyright infringement without proof of knowing
and intentional misrepresentation.
The Sunny Factory asserted no specific facts to support the allegation that Defendants made
a knowing misrepresentation rather than merely a mistake.

The Sunny Factory claims,

“Defendants made the knowing material statements repeatedly to Amazon, and did so with full
and actual knowledge that Plaintiff’s products do not contain infringing materials. Defendants
made the misrepresentations for the purpose of unlawfully stifling competition by abusing and
weaponizing the Amazon IP dispute system.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 102). Again, in a well-pleaded
complaint, “conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to
[the] presumption of truth.” McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616.
Plaintiff’s Response cites to § 512(g)(2)(C) for the premise that Defendants acted
improperly when filing repeated claims for copyright infringement. Plaintiff claims this behavior
without filing a claim in court demonstrates Defendants acted in bad faith. (Dkt. 12). Plaintiff
incorrectly asserts that § 512(g)(2)(C) imposes this requirement on Defendants.

Rather, §

512(g)(2) provides an exception to liability for a service provider’s good faith disabling of access
to material. Count VI is dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [5] is granted. Although
it does not appear that Plaintiff can amend his complaint to comport with this opinion, the Court
provides Plaintiff until 3/23/22 to file any amending pleading or motion if he is able.

Date: March 11, 2022

____________________________________
Virginia M. Kendall
United States District Judge
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